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The VCDR stands as one of the most successful ever international treaties. There are currently 190 States Parties to the Convention, meaning that only 5 or so States worldwide are not States party. According to the ICJ, the Convention is 'accepted through the world by nations of all creeds, cultures and political complexions.'​[1]​ The success of the Convention can be put down, in large part, to the fact that a significant proportion of it constitutes a codification of well-established practice dating back in many cases some hundreds of years. 
Nevertheless, the last 50 years have seen seismic change in the context in which contemporary diplomacy now operates. The Cold War that served as the geopolitical backdrop for the negotiation of the Vienna Convention ended some 25 years ago. The emergence of the globalised economy and the rapid development of technology have undermined the traditional role of diplomats. New diplomatic processes have emerged though the creation of governmental and non-governmental institutions. Notions such as collaborative, public and cultural diplomacy are challenging accepted understandings of the role and function of traditional diplomacy. Additionally, international law is itself changing from a system intended to regulate co-existing and, at times, cooperating sovereignties, into a diverse and possibly fragmented discourse of complex and, at times, competing normative frameworks which themselves challenge the sovereignty paradigm. Such competition is perhaps most apparent in the alleged conflict between international immunities (including diplomatic immunity) and human rights
This chapter will examine the success of the Vienna Convention as an international instrument. It will focus on the reciprocal nature of the Convention and will highlight some of the elements of diplomatic law that are essential to its continued success even in a time of change and challenge. Remembering the origins of diplomatic law among ancient tribes and civilizations up to the modern day, it will be argued that the fundamental principles of diplomacy and the law that governs these principles should be maintained as they are and not opened up to possible deconstruction.
2. Analysing the Success of the Vienna Convention: In Praise of a Self-Contained Regime
In this section, it will be argued that one of the primary reasons for the success of the Vienna Convention lies in its self-contained nature. According to the ICJ:
The rules of diplomatic law … constitute a self-contained regime which, on the one hand, lays down the receiving State’s obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other hand, foresees their possible abuse by members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving State to counter any such abuse.​[2]​
The privileges and immunities of diplomatic missions, and of specified diplomatic personnel,​[3]​ are significant and include the inviolability of person​[4]​ and property;​[5]​ freedom of movement in the receiving State subject to limited exceptions;​[6]​ as well as immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction,​[7]​ and certain privileges and exemptions in relation to duties otherwise owed to the receiving State.​[8]​ The provisions that provide the counterbalance to the privileges and immunities, and thereby facilitate the self-contained nature of the Convention, are framed by Article 41 of the Vienna Convention which places a duty on all persons enjoying privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. This duty is underpinned by what this author has previously referred to as 'administrative measures' contained in Articles 4-11 of the Convention, and 'punitive/deterrent measures' comprising Articles 9, 31(4), 32 and 39(2).​[9]​ It is these counterbalancing provisions of the Convention that will form the basis of the discussion in the remainder of this section.
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention may be seen as a rather pointless provision insofar as the obligation placed on persons enjoying privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State, and indeed not to interfere with the internal affairs of the receiving State, is offset by the phrase 'without prejudice to their privileges and immunities'. It is quite clear from the travaux préparatoires of the Vienna Convention,​[10]​ and from State practice,​[11]​ that the principle of diplomatic inviolability was intended to have overriding force. To some extent therefore, it may be argued that the obligation to comply with local law and regulations is little more than a moral interdiction.​[12]​ However that assertion would misunderstand the interweaving of rights with administrative and punitive/deterrent measures throughout the Convention. As the ICJ has made clear, 'diplomatic law itself provides the necessary means of defence against, and sanctions for, illicit activities by members of diplomatic or consular missions'.​[13]​ 
2.1 Administrative Measures
The administrative measures available to States in Articles 4-11 of the Convention are not specific to the control of abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities. They constitute a range of mechanisms available to every receiving State to limit the size of missions and control the number and, to some extent, the identity of personnel entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities in their territory. If used properly, these provisions can be very effective.​[14]​ 
Article 4 requires the sending State to secure the agrément of the receiving State for the appointment of a Head of Mission.​[15]​ This allows the receiving State to block the appointment of a particular Head of Mission without having to give reasons for that decision.​[16]​ According to Article 7 of the Convention, other members of diplomatic missions, including diplomatic agents, can be freely appointed by the sending State. Only in the case of military, naval and air attachés can the receiving State request that names be provided in advance.​[17]​ 
Nevertheless, Article 7 should be read in conjunction with Article 9. Article 9 provides that the receiving State may declare a diplomat persona non grata and is one of the principal provisions of the Convention dealing with limiting the problem of abuse. The relevance of Article 9 as a sanctioning mechanism will be considered in due course. However, insofar as the receiving State is entitled to invoke Article 9 'at any time and without having to explain its decision', it is clear that the mechanism can be used to limit the granting of diplomatic privileges and immunities to individuals deemed unacceptable to the receiving State. The addition of a final sentence to Article 9(1) at the Vienna Conference to the effect that 'A person may be declared persona non grata or not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State' emphasises the availability of this administrative power as a mechanism to limit the granting of diplomatic privileges and immunities to specific individuals. It might be argued that this undermines the explicit power of the sending State in Article 7 freely to appoint members of their mission, but in this case, the balance has been struck in favour of the receiving State. That having been said, if a receiving State chooses not to undertake the necessary due diligence inquiries to identify and vet those individuals who are being accredited to it, their right to call foul when privileges and immunities are abused is significantly undermined. The limitation in Article 7 that allows sending States not to provide names can be overcome either by prior agreement between the two States or during the accreditation process itself. Bearing in mind the significant advances in technology that have occurred since 1961, it would not seem to be a difficult task to identify and check on the specific identity of any person who is working in or associated with a diplomatic mission in any country and exclude any 'undesirables'.
Further restrictions on the right freely to appoint diplomatic personnel are to be found in Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. Article 10 of the Convention requires that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receiving State be notified of the arrival and final departure of members of a diplomatic mission as well as family members of such individuals, the arrival and departure of private servants of members of the mission as well as dates of ending of employment as such and finally of appointment of permanent residents of the receiving State as persons entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities, although in relation to this final category, it can be noted that the privileges and immunities of private residents of the receiving State are significantly limited by other provisions of the Convention.​[18]​ Article 11 provides that '[i]n the absence of specific agreement as to the size of the mission, the receiving State may require that the size of a mission be kept within limits considered by it to be reasonable and normal, having regard to circumstances and conditions in the receiving State and to the needs of the particular mission'.​[19]​ It is clear that without agreement, the question of the size of mission is left entirely at the discretion of the receiving State.
None of these administrative measures provide direct sanctions for abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities (except where Article 9 is specifically so used, as explained below). Nevertheless, a close examination of the travaux préparatoires of the Draft Convention and of the Conference proceedings reveals that where existing customary law was unclear as to the precise balance of power between the sending and receiving States, the ultimate right to determine who is and is not entitled to accreditation and, as a consequence, entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities, was left with the receiving State.​[20]​ Once again it is worth highlighting that where a State chooses not to apply Articles 4-11 as strictly as they are otherwise entitled, as happened in the Yvonne Fletcher case, then the right of the receiving State to complain about abuse is limited.
It order fully to understand the importance of the administrative measures provided for in the Vienna Convention, it is worth dwelling on the Fletcher case and its aftermath. Without going into significant detail it will be recalled that WPC Fletcher was killed by a bullet that was fired from inside the premises of the Libyan People’s Bureau located in St James’s Square, London.​[21]​ WPC Fletcher had been policing a peaceful demonstration directed against the Gaddafi regime in Libya. After the incident, the 'embassy' was held in lock down for eleven days while the Government considered what their response should be. Ultimately, all occupants of the building were permitted to leave London and return to Tripoli. The matter was referred to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, whose 1984 Report​[22]​ was responded to the by the Government in 1985.​[23]​ 
2.2 Punitive/Deterrent Measures
The 'sanctions for illicit activities' referred to by the ICJ in the Hostages Case, may not at first appear to be sanctions and, in fact, have led one leading barrister to suggest that the Convention is little more than a 'charter for impunity' that should, be abandoned immediately.​[24]​ However, this is little more than a rather trite soundbite that indicates a disregard for the moral integrity of the vast majority of diplomatic personnel and, more importantly, of the deterrent values of these provisions. 
The measures that a State can take after an allegation of abuse of immunities by a diplomat are contained in Articles 9, 31(4), 32 and 39(2) of the Vienna Convention. The power to declare an individual persona non grata, by virtue of Article 9 of the Convention, and to require his or her removal from the receiving State, is the most immediately available response for a State facing abuse. The remedy is apparently unlimited and States are not required to give reasons for declaring an individual persona non grata, though they often do. On the other hand, State practice suggests that States are unwilling to use this remedy except in the case of the most serious abuse.​[25]​ It is difficult fully to explain such an approach. It can partly be explained by the fear of reciprocal action.​[26]​ Additionally, the fear of offending the sending State may limit use of the process.​[27]​ Nevertheless and whatever the reason might be for the limited use of persona non grata, as far as the person endowed with privileges and immunities is concerned, it is likely that the fear of being declared persona non grata is a significant deterrent against abuse. It would be a mistake by such an individual to assume that any State will follow 'normal' practice in every case.
Article 31(4) of the Convention provides that 'the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State'. The question of jurisdiction, particularly criminal jurisdiction is a complex one. The mere fact that jurisdiction is available to the sending State does not necessarily mean that the sending State, or indeed anyone else for that matter, will be able to exercise that jurisdiction. Attempts at the ILC​[28]​ and again at the Vienna Conference​[29]​ to require States to designate a competent court to hear cases relating, in particular, to debts incurred by diplomats, were rejected. Ultimately, the barriers to pursuing a successful civil claim or criminal prosecution in the sending State are remote. As this author has previously noted, problems such as securing the attendance of witnesses, production of evidence and the problems of  a fair trial, as well as the costs involved in bringing a claim or mounting a prosecution in the sending State, even if that were possible, mitigate strongly against the success of Article 31(4) as a deterrent.​[30]​ Nevertheless, the mere fact that the provision exists alongside the statement of immunity contained earlier in Article 31(1) should at the very least give diplomatic personnel some pause for thought in terms of avoiding abuse of their privileged status.
Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention is similarly limited as a sanction not by its terms but by the opportunities that exist for it to be fully applied. Article 39(2) provides that the immunity of a diplomatic agents ceases when he or she leaves the receiving State, except in relation to acts performed in the exercise of official functions for which immunity remains. Article 39(2) was used 'by analogy' in the determination of the immunity to be ascribed to General Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean Head of State, in relation to his requested extradition from the UK to Spain in 1998. One of the key questions in that case concerned whether the crimes of which Pinochet was accused could be considered acts performed by Pinochet in the exercise of his functions as head of State. Similar issues might arise if a diplomat were accused of comparable crimes in a receiving State. However, the application of Article 39(2) is severely limited by the fact that the individual is required to be given a 'reasonable period in which to leave the receiving State'. It is unlikely that the sending State will choose to extradite an accused back to the receiving State, particularly where it will have previously taken the decision not to waive the immunity of that same individual. What is required is that the individual accused voluntarily decides to return to the receiving State, something that would seem to be unusual. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the recent application of Article 39(2) in relation to the arrest of an individual accused of the shooting of WPC Fletcher on 19 November 2015.​[31]​ It appears that in this case, the individual may have voluntarily returned to the UK, although whether he expected to be arrested in relation to that crime is unclear.
Arguably the single most important deterrent of abuse is to be found in Article 32 of the Convention which deals with the issue of waiver of immunity. Theoretically this provision should provide the solution to the problem of the abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities by providing the ultimate deterrent. However, it would appear that States are generally unwilling to waive immunity, particularly in relation to serious offences. The wording of Article 32 makes it clear that there is no obligation on States to waive diplomatic immunity in any circumstances. It enunciates a right which a State is entitled to exercise according to its own determination. Thus, even the earliest drafts of the article in question refer to the fact that a State 'may' waive immunity.​[32]​ It is worth noting that an attempt was made at the Vienna Conference to hold States responsible for damage caused by diplomatic personnel by including a requirement that States make fair compensation for such damage. The proposal, which was put forward by the Holy See, was intended to ensure the accountability of States for the action of their representatives in cases where the immunity of those representatives was not waived.​[33]​ However, the proposal was soundly rejected by the vast majority of States, who made clear their opposition to there being any sense of obligation to waive immunity or to pay damages in lieu.​[34]​  
It would seem that the general attitude of States against there being an obligation to waive immunity is reflected in the current practice of States generally to refuse to waive diplomatic immunity. The UK Government noted in 1985 that: 
[t]he main abuse lies not so much in the comparative number of alleged offences (which is small) or in their relative gravity, but in the reliance on immunity to protect individuals for offences without any obvious connection to the efficient performance of the functions of a diplomatic mission.​[35]​  
As the decision whether or not to waive diplomatic immunity lies with the sending State and not the individual, it would appear that the UK Government was of the view that the primary abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities lay in the refusal of States to waive diplomatic immunity in appropriate cases. On the other hand, the UK Government was unwilling to pursue any mechanism by which the waiving of diplomatic immunity could be more easily achieved. It concluded that, even if it was objectively justifiable to impose an obligation to waive immunity, in appropriate circumstances, there was no support for such a move, not even on a limited basis amongst close allies:
We have found … no support within the European Community or elsewhere for the idea of bilateral or limited mutual agreements to waive immunity either generally or in specific cases. There would, in any case, be a risk that a restriction on immunity could in certain countries be exploited for political or retaliatory purposes against British diplomats and communities overseas.​[36]​ 
Whether such a position would be maintained in the European Union today is moot, particularly in the context of the development of the notion of EU citizenship and the more recent consolidation of the Common Foreign and Security Pillar of the EU into the EU Treaty, as well as the development of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which, since 2010, effectively functions as the diplomatic service of the EU.​[37]​ On the other hand, neither the various agreements giving rise to the EEAS, nor any other published agreements of member States of the EU since 2010 make explicit reference to the question of there being a mutual duty to waive immunity and it would seem that in spite of ever closer union of States in the EU and the nature of European citizenship, the waiver of immunity will continue to be the exception rather than the rule. 
Ultimately, the decision as to whether or not to waive immunity is not a legal one. Rather, it is a political decision based upon a number of factors which take account of the possibility of retaliatory measures being taken against diplomatic personnel, most obviously in the form of trumped up or fabricated charges, but which also take account of the wider general interests of the State in question. The political nature of the decision as to whether or not to waive diplomatic immunity in any particular instance is most apparent in the US Department of State’s 1986 Guidance to the Foreign Service. The Guidance noted that:
[T]he individual, who ultimately benefits from the immunity, has no power to waive immunity even in cases where he or she believes that it would be in his or her personal or commercial interest to do so. Rather, the sending State must waive immunity when it judges that to do so is in the national interest. ​[38]​
In the same note, the Department of State made clear it policy against the waiving of immunity:
While the power to waive immunity is always available, it is the usual practice of the Department of State to waive only in benign circumstances.​[39]​ 
It would seem, accordingly, that matters of justice in the receiving State are very much of secondary consideration to the national interests of the US in making such a determination. 
This attitude apparently prevails throughout the world driven by a sense that waiver is the exception and, to some extent believing, rightly or wrongly, that waiver of immunity in one case would open the door to future requests for waiver that would be increasingly difficult to resist. This was apparently the view of the Government of St Lucia when it refused to waive the immunity of Dr Walid Juffali, its permanent representative to the International Maritime Organisation in London, who was facing a civil claim in the British courts in relation to a divorce settlement. It is difficult to question the assertion by the Government in this case that 'based on the legal advice it received and diplomatic practice in such matters, the case does not warrant the lifting of … immunity'.​[40]​
2.3 The Vienna Convention as a Self-Contained Regime – Some Concluding Thoughts
This overview of sanctions available to prevent and punish breaches of diplomatic privileges and immunities illustrates that there are significant measures available to receiving States to deal with the problem of abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities, but highlight that preventive measures may be limited either by practical and legal difficulties or through political choice. The deterrent effect of these measures cannot but influence the conduct of diplomatic personnel, particularly those serving States who are willing to punish breaches of diplomatic personnel abroad when those individuals return to their home State, either through criminal or civil process, or, more likely, through employment measures such as demotion or restrictions on promotion. The significant problems arise where diplomats are accused of offences that are not taken seriously, or are even condoned by the sending State. 
The commission of parking offences is one such example. The UK Government’s review of diplomatic privileges and immunities undertaken in the aftermath of the Fletcher incident recognised not only the problem of serious abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities but also of the 'proliferation of driving and parking offences for which immunity is claimed' giving rise to significant public concern in capital cities around the world.​[41]​ The UK Government made clear its desire to deal with this problem and indicated that it had both the right and the inclination to deal with repeat offenders, primarily through engagement with the relevant Head of Mission and ultimately through the persona non grata process.​[42]​ Nevertheless, since 1995, as is apparent from the annual survey of serious offences committed by persons entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities in the United Kingdom, it is clear that the number of parking offences committed by individuals entitled to diplomatic immunity has not reduced substantially and there is little apparent effort to deal with repeat offenders despite the clear information as to which States those offenders represent.​[43]​ 
Ultimately, it is asserted that the Vienna Convention provides sufficient tools to ensure the balancing of the interests of both sending and receiving States. It is strengthened by the bilateralism that is at the core of every diplomatic relationship insofar as every sending State is also a receiving State and, in most cases, engage in the exchange of diplomatic personnel. To that extent, the self-contained nature of the Convention allows States to avoid disputes by training and advising their representatives fully and, where disputes occasionally occur, to sort them out by recognising the mutually beneficial impact of observing the Convention in its fullest respects.
3. The Future of the Vienna Convention in a Changing World
It cannot be denied that the nature of intercourse between States is changing. Some would argue that the nation State is a dying concept, others that it is already dead. Reference has already been made to the development of the EEAS which might, one day, replace the individual diplomatic services of the member States of the EU. As far-fetched as this process seems, it will not lead to a radical transformation of the diplomatic process as we know it today insofar as representatives of the EU (EU diplomats) will continue to engage with non-EU powers in much the same way as State representatives do today. 
The concept of public diplomacy suggests a significant role for individuals and groups in influencing the conduct of foreign relations. It would seem, however, that public diplomacy is directed more at influencing of both domestic and foreign public opinion than it is in listening to it.​[44]​ In this context, public diplomacy might be regarded as simply an updated form of traditional diplomacy. Nevertheless, at its best, public diplomacy is a process of global engagement and dialogue that can positively influence international relations. 
One of the most significant developments in international relations since the 1960s has been the progress of globalisation. Globalisation has effected diplomacy in at least two significant ways. First, the need for diplomatic and consular interaction between States has arguably increased rather than diminished, in order to ensure that the interests of nationals living abroad are fully protected. Secondly, the engagement of individuals, societies and diaspora has required States to consider the impact of their foreign relations on individuals living abroad. The intermingling and, at times, interdependence of populations has shifted the focus of diplomacy to more specifically commercial and, increasingly, to cultural matters, and has forced politicians to consider the position of their own nationals in foreign States when considering attacks of whatever form on those states in which their nationals are resident.
The impact of globalisation on the Vienna Convention is difficult to assess in its entirety. However, some recent cases in the United Kingdom point to a need potentially to reassess the Convention to deal with issues such as human rights abuses by diplomatic personnel as well as the development of a trend towards the appointment of what might be called 'resident diplomats'. Each of these will be considered in turn in the following sub-sections, which will ultimately assert that amendment to the Convention is neither necessary nor possible in response to either of these emerging difficulties but that receiving States, in particular, should begin more rigorously to use the existing Convention provisions to crack down on abuse and to minimise the scope for abuse.
3.2 Balancing Immunities and Human Rights and the Prioritisation of the Vienna Convention
The balancing of the granting of international immunities with human rights concerns more generally has been the focus of a considerable degree of attention in recent years. It has given rise to significant challenges to the broad range of immunities from jurisdiction, especially State and Head of State immunity in the face of mass human rights atrocities.​[45]​ The debate is on-going and is one to which the present author has contributed.​[46]​ The primary concern for the purposes of this chapter, relates to the potential impact of this debate on the specific question of the immunity of diplomatic agents and, consequently, on the future of the Vienna Convention.
The framework of analysis of the relationship between immunities from jurisdiction and human rights draws heavily on the so-called fragmentation of international law described by the ILC in its 2006 Report of the same name.​[47]​ The Report argued that international law was becoming fragmented into a number of different subsystems, few of which related to one another and some of which called into question the validity of one another.​[48]​ The response to such fragmentation can be found in technical legal analysis drawing upon principles such as lex specialis, lex posterior, normative hierarchy and self-contained regimes.​[49]​ Having established that diplomatic law is a self-contained regime, one might be content to accept that diplomatic law exists away from other subsystems of international law and can therefore function independently thereof. However, no subsystem can exist in such a vacuum. The relationship between immunity from jurisdiction and human rights law is one that has created a great deal of controversy in recent years. While mostly applicable in the context of state and head of state immunity, the problem of the relationship between human rights and diplomatic law is steadily increasing. 
The dominant narrative of the relationship between international immunities and human rights has been focused around the concept of normative hierarchy with many asserting that particular human rights, dealing in particular with international crimes and gross violations of human rights, have a superior status in international law and constitute jus cogens.​[50]​ This discourse is problematic for diplomatic law insofar as it has no higher status than any other subsystems of international law. Diplomatic law is certainly not a system of jus cogens norms, yet its importance to the proper and efficient functioning of the international diplomatic process cannot be ignored
A better framework of analysis would be that of lex specialis in so far as is the special importance of the Vienna Convention regime lies both in its facilitation of international diplomacy, but also in its provision of a framework for the protection of diplomatic personnel, who are often living in hostile countries, facing hostile day to day living conditions and require special protection in order to do their work.​[51]​ In many ways, it is the special nature of diplomatic law in facilitating the diplomatic process and providing protection that allows it to take priority over local civil and criminal law. Where that law is abused, the Convention provides the necessary remedies. This should surely be the same when the rules of diplomatic privileges and immunities come into conflict with human rights law that has not reached the level of jus cogens norms, that is, the vast majority of human rights norms. 
Recent allegations of abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities have focussed on the alleged abuse of domestic staff in the employ of an individual diplomat or of a mission. Given the potential sanctions against abuse outlined previously, and the greater difficulty of condoning such abuse by failing to take action on political grounds, it would seem that the Vienna Convention does not prevent a receiving State from acting against an individual diplomat or against a sending State in such cases. The problem in such cases concerns the gathering of evidence given that the premises of a diplomatic mission and of the private residence of a diplomatic agent are inviolable and immune from search. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the Vienna Convention is not a mechanism of impunity and does not prohibit a receiving State from investigating an alleged offence, particularly in light of Article 38(2) discussed above. 
The innovative and imaginative process recently introduced in Vienna, Austria, which invites domestic staff of missions and diplomatic households to attend regular interviews to ascertain whether there is any cause for concern in relation to domestic abuse is compliant with the Vienna Convention. Insofar as States are required to register the entry and departure of domestic staff in compliance with the Vienna Convention, it should be possible to ensure that the vast majority of domestic staff are interviewed where necessary.​[52]​ This can be enforced by 'imposing' a requirement on embassies to ensure compliance. While such a requirement is unenforceable, it can be the focus of local oversight. Examples of serious abuse or non-cooperation with local authorities can result in declarations of persona non grata and the breaking off of diplomatic relations with a State where the abuse is considered sufficiently serious. The Vienna Convention should not be seen as a block to engagement with embassies and diplomatic agents. Insofar as it provides for remedies for abuse, it clearly provides opportunities to minimise abuse, depending on the exercise of political will, the lack of which is itself possibly the greatest threat to the future of the Vienna Convention.
In relation to allegations of human rights abuses that meet the threshold of jus cogens breaches, one would hope in the first place that receiving States would complete the due diligence and block the accreditation of an individual who is the subject of such accusations in the first place.​[53]​ However, if that were not the case or where allegations of gross human rights abuses were to arise during the course of an appointment, the mechanism of declaring an individual persona non grata and expelling them from the receiving State, perhaps with a referral to the prosecuting authorities of the sending State, or of an international tribunal, such as the International Criminal Court, would lead to prosecution and ensure compliance with the Vienna Convention. This might seem inadequate to some, and it certainly does not sit lightly with the present author. On the other hand it is important to recognise the impact that arresting such an individual might have on the protection of diplomatic personnel around the world.
3.2 Expanding Jurisdictions and Globalised Living
When the Vienna Convention was drafted in 1961 the growth and impact of globalisation was unimagined. The diplomatic relations that the Convention was designed to regulate involved the traditional exchange of diplomats who were expected primarily to be nationals of sending States working solely to develop the interests of that State. Some provision was made in the Vienna Convention to regulate the privileges and immunities of nationals of third States and indeed nationals of the receiving State,​[54]​ as well as to remove immunity from the commercial activities of diplomats where that activity was unconnected with the interests of the sending State.​[55]​ However these exceptions to the traditional, rather staid, norms of diplomatic relations were rare.
Developments in the function and style of some aspects of diplomacy, particularly high-level diplomacy, and issues related to representation at international organisations and the privileges and immunities of international organisations themselves merited the development of special regimes.​[56]​ However, these regimes were based essentially on the established rules of diplomatic law in the Vienna Convention. The same applied to the regulation of consular intercourse.​[57]​ 
The situation today is considerably more complex. Diplomats come and go much more regularly; 'special representatives' are sent by smaller States to embassies and organisations; individuals are accorded diplomatic privileges and immunities in countries in which they have extensive private interests, some of which overlap with the interests of the sending State. One of the most significant developments since 1961 concerns the enormous expansion of both civil and criminal jurisdiction of States.​[58]​ In terms of international criminal law, crimes that were previously prosecutable only domestically can now be prosecuted internationally. For serving diplomats, the precedents are quite clear in that immunity overrides criminal jurisdiction, regardless of how local or international that jurisdiction is.​[59]​ However that straightforward position is increasingly being challenged on the grounds that developments in international criminal jurisdiction must be matched by changes to the law of immunity.​[60]​ In terms of civil law, the exterritoriality of jurisdiction is giving rise to a situation where claims un-related to the diplomatic intercourse between the two States involved are being challenged in the domestic court of sending States.​[61]​
The matter is complicated slightly by the emergence of a category of diplomats or other representatives who are not permanently resident in the territory of the receiving State but who have business interests there and, perhaps own property there.​[62]​ The Vienna Convention does except from immunity civil cases concerning a real action relating to private immovable property and actions relating to professional and commercial activities by a diplomatic agent outside his official functions. Nevertheless, it would appear that these exceptions are rather limited as highlighted by two recent cases in the British courts. 
The first concerned Dr Wahid Juffali, a Saudi Arabian national appointed as the representative of St Lucia to the International Maritime Organisation based in London.​[63]​ Juffali asserted diplomatic immunity in response to court proceedings brought by his ex-wife Christina Estrada, a former supermodel. The British government, perhaps unusually for such a private case, requested St Lucia to waive Juffali’s immunity The St Lucian Government opted not to, asserting their rights as a sovereign State 'in order to uphold the principle' of diplomatic immunity. Given the analysis of the right of waiver set out above, this was neither unusual nor was it out of line with State practice. Crucially for this case, there are no restrictions in international law concerning the appointment of non-nationals to such positions, and it is common practice in the Caribbean for States to do so. At the time of appointment, the IMO did not raise any questions at the time of appointment relating to Juffali's credentials. More importantly, the UK did not raise any concerns and immediately added Juffali to the Diplomatic List, thereby confirming his diplomatic status and entitlement to full diplomatic immunity. 
The UK Government, and more specifically the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is the gatekeeper for determining who is entitled to diplomatic immunity in the UK. As analysed above, the Vienna Convention allows sending States a free choice of whom to appoint to specific diplomatic roles. However, it also allows a receiving State to decline the nomination, by declaring the individual persona non grata prior to his or her attaining full diplomatic status.​[64]​ This would have been the time to question the appointment of Juffali, if indeed there had been any concerns.
One of the most obvious concerns in the context of the present discussion should have been the considerable immovable assets held by Juffali in the United Kingdom. It is likely that Juffali’s ex-wife, who is not herself a British national, brought the case in the UK because of that fact. The assets themselves provided the jurisdictional link sufficient to allow her to bring the case in the UK Courts. Insofar as Juffali’s immunity has not been waived and he has not been declared persona non grata his immunity remains and Juffali’s assets are immunised. This has the potential to create significant difficulties in major capital cities around the world if the trend of appointing such individuals continues. However, the remedy already exists. Given the above analysis, it is open to a receiving State simply to refuse to accredit a State representative if to do so would immunise significant assets. For that reason, it is important that the authorities of receiving States should undertake the necessary due diligence when deciding whether or not to accredit a State representative to a position that brings with it diplomatic privileges and immunities
An alternative reading of such appointments has been suggested; that the majority of such appointments are shams. Furthermore, it has been asserted that in the case of ‘sham’ appointments, diplomatic immunity could simply be removed. This was the view taken by Mr Justice Hayden in the first instance in the case of Estrada v Al-Juffali.​[65]​ While superficially attractive, such an option is replete with problems. First, it would require complete renegotiation of the Vienna Convention. Secondly, it would generate conflict between sending States and receiving States about when an appointment is sham and when it is not. If the UK were unilaterally to adopt such an approach, not only would it be in direct contravention of international law, it would also open up British diplomats serving abroad to claims that they were not doing their job (according to officials of the receiving State) and expose them to the removal of immunity by the receiving State without recourse to their home country. Ultimately such an approach would render diplomatic immunity useless and would wholly undermine international relations. Although Al-Juffali’s appeal failed, the question of his appointment as a diplomat was declared not to be reviewable by the British courts.​[66]​
A second on-going civil claim in the British courts that has been met with a claim of immunity is that of the former Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, who is facing a civil claim for compensation for torture allegedly carried out against a British citizen under his authority. Al-Thani was appointed as Minister Counsellor in the Qatari Embassy in London and that appointment was accepted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The circumstances of this case are considerably more problematic insofar as they involve allegations of torture and possibly invocation of an argument for removal of immunity based on a breach of a jus cogens. The current jurisprudence of the English courts would mitigate against that but courts appear to become increasingly frustrated with the assertion of immunity in such cases. Once again, however, it is asserted that the problem lies with a failure of due diligence by the United Kingdom government. It is likely that the FCO was aware of allegations of torture being made against Al-Thani prior to acceptance of his appointment as Minister Counsellor. Furthermore, Al-Thani appears to own a string of luxury hotels in the UK. The jurisdictional issue in this case was not dependent on the ownership of property in the UK given the fact that the claimant was a British national. Nevertheless, the effect of accepting Al-Thani;s appointment was to immunise him and his property from a claim of this nature in the UK. His immunity was upheld by the High Court in February 2016 in the case of Al Attiya v Bin-Jassim Bin-Jaber Al Thani.​[67]​  Mr Justice Blake in that case refused to entertain assertions that Al-Thani’s appointment was a sham.
The response of many to the changes to diplomatic process brought about by globalisation since 1961 and their impact on the Vienna Convention has been to call for a renegotiation of the Convention itself. Such calls came as early as 1984 as an obvious response to the murder of WPC Fletcher. Indeed this author undertook his own PhD with that exact solution in mind. However, the review of the Vienna Convention conducted by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the British Government in response to the murder of Yvonne Fletcher was to the effect that 'the difficulties in the way of achieving any restrictive amendment to the Convention and the doubtful net benefit to the UK of so doing, it would be wrong to regard amendment of the Vienna Convention as a solution to the problem of the abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities'.​[68]​ The Government agreed with this assessment at the time and would be right to do so again today. 
The Vienna Convention, as a self-contained regime, provides both the rights and the remedies for abuse of those rights. Those remedies are not perfect but they are the best that the parties could agree. To think that more restrictive remedies could be agreed today is fanciful. That having been said, more political will to enforce the existing provisions of the Vienna Convention would go a considerable way to clamp down on and deter further abuse of the Convention from the basic but often highlighted parking offences, to abuse of domestic staff, to sham appointments and ultimately to murder. Crucially, as highlighted by the analysis above, a greater willingness of States to refuse to accept appointed representatives who raise concerns, as permitted by Article 9 of the Vienna Convention would go a long way to reducing the potential for abuse.
4. Conclusions
The Vienna Convention’s success is on-going. It is dependent on a number of key factors. First, the Convention is bilateral and, to a large extent, symmetric. Although a State may be larger or smaller, powerful or weaker, popular or hated, the Vienna Convention underscores the importance of sovereign equality that is enshrined in the United Nations Charter. States do not have to have diplomatic relations with one another and some choose not to but the vast majority do and they rely on the Veinna Convention to facilitate the performance of diplomatic functions and to ensure the protection of their representatives. Those representatives are essentially responsible. They take seriously their duties to their home States and to the maintenance of good relations between the sending and receiving State. Occasionally persons entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities will take advantage of their position and abuse those rights. This is undoubtedly the exception rather than the rule. When that happens, the self-contained nature of the Vienna Convention has already set out the remedies that should be adopted. 
Some may argue that the 'punishments' contained in the Convention are not enough and where States do not investigate and, where appropriate, punish a diplomatic agent who is expelled from a State after an accusation of abuse then that argument appears well founded. However prevention is better than cure. The UK review of diplomatic privileges and immunities after the shooting of Yvonne Fletcher identified a number of ways in which the application of the Convention could be strengthened, particularly though the administrative measures. Recent history of FCO oversight of the accreditation of diplomats and State representatives on the face of it, does not suggest that sufficient lessons have been learned from that process.
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